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Unauthorized Annexing of an Artist's World:
An Argument for Creator-Assignee Standing
to Sue for Copyright Infringement
Karen A. Skretkowiczt
I. INTRODUCTION
The thrill of creation which we experience
when we see a masterpiece is not unlike
the feeling of the artist who created it;
such a work is a fragment of the world
which he has annexed and
which belongs to him alone.
Similar to Andr6 Malraux, lawmakers acknowledge that a
creator's 2 work is marked with the creator's personality, 3 but how far
should copyright law go to protect a creator's "fragment of the world"?
1 J.D. candidate, 2007, Seattle University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Gail Manuguid,
Alison Bettles and her editing team, and the staff of the Seattle University Law Review for their
thoughtful guidance and support. The author also thanks Deborah Boe, Jaime Huff, and Elizabeth
Talbot for the support, friendship, and laughter shared during ferry rides. Most especially, the author
wishes to thank her family, to whom she dedicates this work. The author thanks her parents and
sisters for their love and encouragement; her children, Elizabeth and Christopher, for their love and
inspiration; and her husband, Steve, for his love, support, and patience and for his willingness to
forego perhaps more exciting career opportunities to allow the author to complete this journey.
1. ANDR" MALRAUX, THE VOICES OF SILENCE 461 (Stuart Gilbert trans., Princeton Univ. Press
1978) (1953).
2. For consistency and to avoid confusion with the constitutional and statutory use of the term
"author," the generic term "creator" will be used to refer to the individual who originated the work,
from initial idea to final embodiment.
3. See, for example, the statement of Senator Orrin Hatch, "The mark of the artist's personality
is on everything that he or she creates." David Robb, Hatch Urges Film Rights Talks, HOLLYWOOD
REP., Apr. 21, 1997, at 5.
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This inquiry raises two questions. First, what rights are protected?
Second, whose rights are protected?
The answer to the "what rights" question appears straightforward if
one reviews only the Constitution's Copyright Clause and the current
copyright statute. The Copyright Clause of the Constitution empowers
Congress "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their re-
spective writings and discoveries." '4 Thus, the clause grants an "exclusive
right" to an author's "writings." Additionally, the clause's language un-
derscores two goals for federal copyright law-promoting progress and
protecting creators' works. Underlying these goals are both economic
and non-economic justifications.6
In the current copyright statute, Congress has further defined the
Constitution's "exclusive right." The exclusive right is comprised of five
separate rights: (1) the right of reproduction; (2) the right to create
derivative works; (3) the right to distribute the work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership; (4) the right to perform the work publicly;
and (5) the right to display the work publicly . Each of these rights is
transferable and divisible. 8
However, United States' treaty obligations cloud the answer to the
"what rights" question. The United States is a signatory to an interna-
tional copyright treaty, the Berne Convention for Protection of Literary
and Artistic Property (Berne Convention). 9 Under the Berne Convention,
two additional authorial rights are protected: (1) an author's "right to
claim authorship"; and (2) an author's right of integrity, that is, "to object
to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory
action" toward the work that "would be prejudicial to [the author's]
honor or reputation."10 With few exceptions," Congress has not enacted
any provisions protecting these authorial rights.
The answer to the "whose rights" question is not straightforward.
The Constitution grants Congress the power to give "authors" the
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
5. See discussion infra Part ILA.
6. See discussion infra Part 11.B.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
8. Id. § 201(d).
9. Berne Convention for Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, Sep. 9, 1886, 123
L.N.T.S. 233 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The Beme Convention is an international treaty for
copyright protection. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
8D.01 [B] (2005). See discussion infra Part 1l.B.2.b.
10. Berne Convention, supra note 9, at art. 6bis.
11. The main exception is the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) that provides some
protection for "works of visual arts." 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2000). See discussion infra Part l.B.2.c.
438 [Vol. 30:437
Creator-Assignee Standing
exclusive right to their works for a limited time,' 2 and under the statute,
initial copyright ownership vests in the "author. 1 3 The copyright statute,
however, never defines who an author is. 14 A common definition of an
author would be the individual who originated or created a work.' 5 But,
under copyright law, "author" is not always synonymous with the human
being who created the work. An "author" may be an employer or some-
one who asks a creator to create a work under the copyright's "work
made for hire" provision.' 6 As an "author," the employer or commis-
sioner of the work "owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright., 17
Thus, the answers to the two initial questions are as follows:
(1) under the Constitution and copyright statute, an "author," who may or
may not be the individual creator of the work, owns five separate "exclu-
sive rights" that can be freely transferred and divided; and (2) under the
Berne Convention, a creator is entitled to protection of his right to claim
authorship and right of integrity.
The copyright statute protects authors' exclusive rights by allowing
a potential plaintiff to bring an action for infringement: anyone who"violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.., is an in-
fringer"' 8 and is subject to an action for infringement.' 9 Answering the
question of which type of plaintiff can bring an action to redress a viola-
tion of one of the rights is complicated. Because federal courts have
jurisdiction over infringement claims arising under federal copyright
law, 20 a plaintiff must satisfy the real party in interest 2 and standing 22
23prerequisites in addition to satisfying the statutory requirements. To
satisfy the real party in interest requirement, a plaintiff must be the per-
son "who possesses the right sought to be enforced." 24 An assignee of an
accrued cause of action qualifies as the real party in interest. 25
12. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2000).
14. See id. § 101 ("Definitions" section of current copyright statute); see also discussion infra
Part II.C.
15. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/author (last
visited November 20, 2006).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).
17. Id
18. Id. § 501(a).
19.1d. § 501(b).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a).
22. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000).
24. 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL § 1542 (3d ed. 1998).
25. Id. at § 1545.
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The standing inquiry involves both a constitutional and statutory
test. To satisfy the constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must establish
that she suffered an injury that was caused by the defendant's conduct
and that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. 26 If the consti-
tutional test is satisfied, a plaintiff must still satisfy the statutory standing
requirement by showing that he or she is the "legal or beneficial owner"
of any exclusive right or part of an exclusive right.27
A plaintiff qualifies as a legal owner if she owns some portion of
one of the exclusive rights. Because of the divisibility of the exclusive
rights, the plaintiff in an infringement case is not required to own the
entire copyright interest.28 Additionally, a "legal owner" can be an
assignee of a copyright interest who also received an assignment of an
accrued cause of action for infringement. 29
Generally, courts have determined beneficial ownership issues
based on whether a plaintiff has an economic interest, such as a royalty
arrangement, in the copyright. 30 As with the term "author," the statute
does not define the term "beneficial owner."3' However, even when a
royalty arrangement exists, if a creator created the work as part of a
work-made-for-hire relationship, the creator may not qualify as a benefi-
cial owner. 32 What if, after an infringement has occurred, a creator
receives an assignment of an accrued cause of action without an assign-
ment of any other interest in the copyright? 33
This Comment surveys the contemporary status of copyright law
regarding a creator-assignee's standing to sue for infringement and the
bases for allowing a creator-assignee to bring an infringement action.34
Part II begins the discussion with a review of the general principles of
copyright law, including its constitutional and statutory frameworks, its
underlying policies, and the moral rights doctrine. Part III continues with
an overview of the general constitutional standing principles and real
party in interest prerequisites. It then outlines the statutory and judicial
limits on standing to sue under copyright law. Part IV discusses the issue
of assignee standing in copyright law and then reviews the issue of
26. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180-81; see discussion infra Part III.A.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000).
28. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, AND TRADEMARKS 168 & n.2 (2003).
29. See discussion infra Part IV.
30. See discussion infra Part III.B.
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); see also discussion infra Part III.B.
32. See discussion infra Part III.B.
33. For ease of reference, the term "creator-assignee" will be used to refer to such a party.
34. The focus of this Comment is on copyright law in the United States. Foreign copyright law,
when discussed, will be clearly identified as such. Therefore, any reference in this article to
"copyright law" refers to U.S. copyright law.
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creator-assignee's standing to sue. This discussion focuses on the recent
case of Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.,35 in which the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a creator-assignee does not have
standing to sue.
Finally, Part V sets forth three arguments for granting a creator-
assignee standing to sue for copyright infringement. First, granting a
creator-assignee standing to sue effectuates Congress's intent that the
rights granted under the Copyright Act of 197636 be divisible and alien-
able. Second, a creator-assignee fulfills the standing and real party in
interest prerequisites. Finally, allowing a creator-assignee standing to sue
advances the constitutional goals of promoting progress and protecting a
creator's rights in her work. The thrust of this argument relies on both the
economic and non-economic justifications of copyright law, in particular
the right of attribution.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF COPYRIGHT LAW
To appreciate why a creator-assignee should have standing to sue,
one must first understand some general principles of copyright law. This
Part provides a summary of these general principles beginning with
copyright's constitutional and statutory frameworks and its underlying
justifications. It concludes by discussing the limited moral rights protec-
tion currently available under U.S. copyright law.
A. The Constitutional Framework
Both the state copyright laws enacted prior to the Constitution and
the Constitution's Copyright Clause recognize the close relationship be-
tween a creator and his work. Prior to adoption of the Constitution, crea-
tors relied on state law for copyright protection.37 While the Continental
Congress had no power to protect literary property, American creators
found a valuable ally in the Continental Congress.38 The Continental
Congress issued a resolution39 encouraging states to provide protection
because "nothing is more properly a man's own than the fruit of his
study. ' 4° While the provisions of each state's statute varied, all of the
35. 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 367 (2005).
36. Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
37. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 106
(1967).
38. id.
39. Id. at 73. The Continental Congress issued the resolution on May 2, 1783. Id. The recom-
mended length of protection was fourteen years after publication. Id.
40. Id. at 113 (citations omitted). In the three years following this resolution, twelve states
enacted copyright statutes; however, it is questionable whether any of the provisions of these statutes
2007]
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statutes had dual purposes-protecting creator's rights and promoting the
public good by providing an incentive to creators.41
By the time of the Constitutional Convention, the inadequacies of
the state systems-lack of uniformity, lack of reciprocity, and insuffi-
cient geographic protection-were apparent.42 The framers, recognizing
these problems and wishing to stimulate a national literature, and the
creators, desiring to obtain domestic protection for their works, proposed
including copyright protection in the constitution draft. 43 The proposal
was uncontroversial and passed without debate. 44
While few writings exist to ascertain the framers' intent,45 those
that do exist reflect the framers' desire to establish a uniform system that
46recognized a creator's inherent right to copyright protection. As James
Madison wrote:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright
of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a
right of the common law. The right to useful inventions seems with
equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coin-
cides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot
separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most
became operational. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 74 (2002).
41. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 40, at 74-75. The preambles for many of the statutes re-
flected a natural law notion of a creator's rights. Id. For example, the preamble to the Massachusetts
copyright statute provided:
Whereas the Improvement of Knowledge, the Progress of Civilization, the public Weal of
the Community, and the Advancement of Human Happiness, greatly depend on the Ef-
forts of learned and ingenious Persons in the various Arts and Sciences: As the principal
Encouragement such Persons can have to make great and beneficial Exertions of this Na-
ture must exist in the legal Security of the Fruits of their Study and Industry to them-
selves; and as such Security is one of the natural Rights of all Men, there being no Prop-
erty more peculiarly a Man's own than that which is produced by the Labour of his mind.
Id. at 75. See also Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary
France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 1000-01 (1990).
42. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 40, at 76-77.
43. BUGBEE, supra note 37, at 107.
44. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 40, at 110. The clause has even been called an "afterthought."
Id.
45. OREN BRACHA, OWNING IDEAS 277 (2005), available at http://www.obracha.net/oi/
Oi4.pdf. Because few writings exist, some have argued that the meaning of the constitutional clause
cannot be ascertained from these writings. Id. According to Bracha,
The dialectic of the meaning of the constitutional clause as both the shaper of doctrine
and practice and the object shaped by them entails an inversion of the originalist method.
If one is to track the meaning of the clause within history, she needs to track the trans-
formation of the conceptual and practical environment within which it was used and
elaborated, rather than try to explain an environment on the basis of the stable original
meaning of the clause.
Id.
46. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 40, at 110.
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of them have anticipated the decision on this point, by laws passed
at the instance of Congress.47
Thus, like the state statutes that existed at the time, Madison also ex-
pressed a desire to promote progress and protect creators.48
As adopted, the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution empow-
ers Congress "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries" 49 Like its precursors, the
Clause underscores two goals for federal copyright law-promoting
progress and providing protection to creators.5 °
B. The Underlying Justifications of Copyright Law
Underlying these constitutional goals lie two competing justifica-
tions for copyright law-an economic (or instrumental) justification and
a non-economic justification. 51 This section explores these two justifica-
tions and the tension that may result when courts attempt to fulfill both.
1. The Economic Justification
Those arguing for a pure economic justification focus on the "pro-
mote the progress" language of the Copyright Clause. 52 Under this the-
ory, copyright law exists to protect creators only to the extent necessary
"to stimulate the optimal level of innovative production." 53 The Supreme
Court has noted this theory aligns with the goal of advancing progress
because an "important public purpose of... copyright ... is ... to moti-
vate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a
special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
48. Id However, while Madison referred to copyright as a common law right, the Court in
Wheaton v. Peters eschewed any common law right. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 663 (1884).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
50. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 40, at 150.
51. The pure economic or utilitarian justification is the predominant justification. See, e.g.,
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1,
32 (2004). However, other non-economic justifications, including a personhood justification, a moral
rights justification, and a natural law justification, have been advanced. Id. See also Steve P. Calan-
drillo, An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights: Justifications and Problems of Exclu-
sive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward
System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301, 305 (1998).
52. See Calandrillo, supra note 51, at 310.
53. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 590, 590 (1987); see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of
Standing Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1323 (2000).
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genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.' 54 By
providing an incentive to create works, copyright law seeks to encourage
production of such works.55
In large part, the instrumental rationale is based on the "public
goods" problem that can be associated with copyrightable works.56 A
typical public goods problem involves provision of a national defense.
Society desires a national defense; however, private citizens lack incen-
tive as individual actors to produce a collective national defense. 57 When
this occurs, government seeks to modify behavior through individualized
incentives. 58 The same is true for copyright. The government addresses
the free rider problem associated with public goods by providing indi-
viduals proprietary rights. 59 "[F]ree riders who have not incurred the
costs of creation are tempted to imitate inventions after others have
developed them. Allowing such imitation obviously would deter future
innovators and result in a suboptimal level of innovation.,' 60
Thus, under the economic justification, while some reward is given
to the creator through the grant of the copyright, the provision of the re-
ward is secondary to the provision of incentives.61
2. Non-Economic Justification: Moral Rights
The non-economic justifications for copyright protection place
creators' interests at the forefront.62 Commentators have characterized
three different non-economic justifications for copyright protection-a
personhood justification, a natural law justification, and a moral rights
justification.63 Because one argument in support of creator-assignee
54. Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1986) (quoting Sony Corp. of Amer-
ica v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)). Compare id., with Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (focusing more on the advancement of the public
good by stating "[t]he primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."). See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954).
55. Calandrillo, supra note 51, at 310.
56. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 28, at 7.
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Carrier, supra note 51, at 32-33.
61. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("[C]opyright law.., makes reward to the owner
a secondary consideration .... The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors .
(citations omitted)).
62. Dreyfuss, supra note 53; see also Carrier, supra note 51 (characterizing this approach as
the "moral rights" approach).
63. See Calandrillo, supra note 51. The natural law justification is based on the Lockean "fruits
of their labor" theory. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equal-
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standing to sue is based on the moral right of attribution, this section
focuses on the moral rights doctrine and its role in U.S. copyright law.
a. General Principles
The moral rights justification is grounded in the belief that the crea-
tor's personality pervades any work she creates and that the work, as an
embodiment of the creator's personality, is deserving of protection.
64
This paradigm perhaps best recognizes what Malraux wrote-that the
fragment of the creator's world that is annexed to the public through her
masterpiece belongs to the creator alone. Proponents argue that a focus
solely on the remunerative components of copyright ownership, through
the provision of incentives, fails to further the constitutional goal of pro-
gress.65 Rather, to further the constitutional goal of progress, the focus
should be on the creator's nonpecuniary interests in his work.66
While other countries' recognition of the moral rights doctrine var-
ies, the doctrine generally encompasses three separate "rights. 67 First,
the "right of disclosure" protects the creator's right to determine when,
if, and how the work will be disclosed.68 Second, the "right of integrity"
protects the creator by preventing others from making changes to the
ity and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1549-64
(1993). While this theory still has its supporters, others argue that Congress has rejected it as incon-
sistent with the framers' intent. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 40, at 235. The rejection of the
natural rights theory is based on language in a House Report from 1894:
The object to be attained and the reason for the constitutional grant of power are imbed-
ded in the grant itself. They are to 'promote the progress of science and the useful arts.'
There is nothing said about any desire or purpose to secure to the author or inventor his
'natural right to his property.' . . . The claims made so often, especially in recent years,
that the author or inventor has a natural fight to the exclusive use of his production, and is
therefore entitled, as of course, to legislation securing to him the full enjoyment of this
right, does not seem to have been specifically passed upon by the fathers; but one thing is
absolutely certain, they did not make this constitutional grant of power upon any such
ground.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 52-1494 (1894)). However, this view conflicts with Madison's views
expressed in Federalist No. 43. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48. An additional justification
is that of protecting a creator's "personhood." Carrier, supra note 51. The personhood justification
is based on a person's need for "property rights to control resources in their external environment."
Id.; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property andPersonhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
64. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8D.02, at 8D-9.
65. Dreyfuss, supra note 53, at 590-91.
66. Id. at 605. The three nonpecuniary interests are the possessory interest, the integrity
interest, and a reputational interest. Id. The possessory interest "is fulfilled by composing a work that
satisfies the creator's initial vision." Id. The integrity interest "is endangered by the process of com-
promising that vision with commercial demands." Id. The reputational interest "turns on how the
work is presented to the public." Id.
67. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possi-
ble?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985).
68. Id.
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work that misrepresent the work's "spirit and character." 69 Third, the
"right of attribution" protects a creator's right to demand recognition for
his work and to prevent others from attributing the work to someone
else.70
Of the three moral rights, the right of attribution is most similar to
the right to be free from infringement. While as a substantive matter
infringement is not synonymous with failure to attribute, the goal of both
doctrines is the same. The right of attribution "recognizes a fundamental
truth about human nature-people typically desire recognition for their
accomplishments .... [P]eople should not receive attribution for some-
thing that is not their creation."'v Copyright infringement is also con-
cerned with improper appropriation of a work.72 Thus, both theories are
concerned with the failure to acknowledge the true creator of a work.
b. The United States'Participation in the Berne Convention
Unlike most European countries, the United States has not adopted
a moral rights regime; however, it began inching toward federal recogni-
tion of moral rights when it joined the Berne Convention.7 3 The Berne
Convention recognizes the right of attribution and right of integrity as
independent from the creator's economic rights and existing even after
transfer of the copyright.74 Article 6bis of the Berne Convention provides
as follows:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
75
The Berne Convention requires that an action to enforce these
rights be governed by the laws of the country where the creator is
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id. at 7. The right of attribution has also been termed the right of paternity. David Nimmer,
The Moral Imperative Against Academic Plagiarism (Without a Moral Right Against Reverse Pass-
ing Of!), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 13 (2004). Nimmer conceptualizes the French right of attribution
along five planes, one of which is "the right to prevent others from being named as the author of
[the] work." Id.
71. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the
Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 985 (2002).
72. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 28, at 169.
73. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853;
see also Public Notice 1086, Department of State, 53 Fed. Reg. 48, 748 (Nov. 22, 1988) (specifying
accession date of March 1, 1989).
74. Berne Convention, supra note 9, at art. 6bis.
75. Id.
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seeking enforcement.76 The Convention presumes that each member
country's laws will protect these rights.77
When Congress decided to join the Berne Convention, it took a
minimalist approach. Under the Berne Convention Implementation Act
(BCIA), Congress amended federal law only as absolutely required for
compliance with the Berne Convention. 78 Rather than add new protec-
tions, Congress intended the BCIA "to preserve the status quo with re-
spect to [moral rights]. 79 Congress concluded that U.S. law already
sufficiently protected moral rights. Specifically, Congress believed exist-
ing law protected a creator's right of attribution and right of integrity
through "various provisions of the Copyright Act and Lenham [sic] Act,
various state statutes, and common law principles such as libel, defama-
tion, misrepresentation, and unfair competition, which have been applied
by courts to redress authors' invocation of the right to claim authorship
or the right to object to distortion., 80
While the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)8 1
agreed with Congress that sufficient moral rights protection existed,
WIPO's strong desire for the United States to join the convention, rather
than the sufficiency of the United States' moral rights protections, stimu-
lated this conclusion. 82 Dr. Arpad Bogsch, Director General of WIPO,
assured Congress that the United States could become a member of the
Berne Convention without adding any moral rights protections to its
laws. 83 Commentators have concluded that Dr. Bogsch and the Senate
76. Id. at art. 6bis(3).
77. Id.
78. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, at OV-5; S. Rep. No. 100-352, at 9 (1988), as re-
printed in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3714. This approach was not without controversy. Panelists
testifying before the subcommittee included publishing representatives arguing against the addition
of an artist's right to control attribution or alteration and movie directors and screenwriters arguing
for additional protection of an artist's right to control alterations to his creation. Id. at 3711. More-
over, several parties testified regarding the insufficiency of other laws to protect the creator's per-
sonality interests and urged for federal recognition of moral rights. See Brown, Adherence to the
Berne Copyright Convention: The Moral Rights Issue, 35 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 196, 204-05
(1988).
79. S. Rep. No. 100-352, at 10 (1988), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3715.
80. Id. at 9-10, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3715; see also Nimmer, supra note 70, at 19-20 (dis-
cussing blue-ribbon commission conclusion that U.S. law at this time was compatible with the Berne
Convention).
81. The World Intellectual Property Organization administers the Berne Convention. S. Rep.
No. 100-352, at 11 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3716.
82. Nimmer, supra note 70, at 20.
83. S. Rep. No. 100-352, at 10 (1988), as reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3715. Indeed, the
only changes that WIPO insisted the United States make to comply with the Berne Convention in-
volved the removal of the formalities concerning notice and registration. Id. at 11, 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3716. The BCIA eliminated the prerequisite that transfers of ownership must be
recorded prior to the transferee's initiation of an infringement action. Berne Convention Implemen-
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Committee "were inspired by" the member countries' and American au-
thors' desire to join the Berne Convention. 84 Indeed, as at least one
commentator has noted, "it is a stretch to maintain that the law in the
United States as of the enactment of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988 was congruent with Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention.
However, Congress, believing that sufficient protection for moral
rights already existed, encouraged courts to continue to apply these prin-
ciples "as they would be in the absence of United States' adherence to
Berne. ' 86 Congress specifically admonished courts not to look to the
Berne Convention or the laws of the other signatories to the Berne Con-
vention to try to reduce or expand moral rights protection. 87 Moreover,
Congress ensured that the BCIA contained a specific provision express-
ing that the Berne Convention was not self-executing. 88
c. Glimmers of Moral Rights Protection
Shortly after passing the BCIA, Congress began to expand its pre-
viously minimalist approach to moral rights. In the early 1990s, Congress
adopted some Berne Convention standards not previously recognized in
the United States when it granted protection to architectural works and
adopted the Berne Convention's standard for such protection.89 Although
tation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853. The BCIA also eliminated the requirement
of mandatory copyright notice. Id.
84. Nimmer, supra note 70, at 23 n.123.
85. Id. at 22 (footnotes omitted); see also Kwall, supra note 67, at 4 (arguing that state statutes
and common law principles are ineffective protection for creators' moral rights).
86. S. Rep. No. 100-352, at 10 (1988), 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3715 ("Because existing U.S.
law satisfies the requirements of Article 6bis of Berne, the committee has decided not to address the
question of whether new provisions should be added to the Copyright Act or other statutes with
respect to the author's right of paternity or right of integrity. The committee believes that U.S. ad-
herence to the Berne Convention, and satisfaction of U.S. obligations under that Convention, should
not change current law on this subject.").
87. Id. at 10-11, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3715-16.
Neither Beme adherence, nor the satisfaction of U.S. obligations under Berne, should be
used by the courts as a justification either for expanding or reducing the recognition of
[the rights of attribution and integrity] under U.S. law .... [T]he provisions of Berne it-
self may not be used as the basis for a decision in cases involving rights of paternity or
integrity.
Id. at 39, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3736.
88. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 2(1), 102 Stat.
2853. Congress was hesitant about leaving this question to the courts. S. Rep. No. 100-352 at 38, as
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3735. "The committee considers it advisable to include these decla-
rations in the legislation in order to make it absolutely clear to the courts that any claim that Bere is
self-executing should be rejected. Rights and responsibilities of authors, copyright owners, users or
domestic law, are not under Berne itself." Id.
89. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 104 Stat. 5089 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of Title 17 U.S.C.).
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Congress's recognition of the need to protect architectural works was
significant, Congress took an even bigger step forward when it recog-
nized the need to protect certain moral rights of creators of "works of
visual arts" and adopted the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA).90
While VARA provides some moral rights protection, it is extremely
limited.9' First, VARA only applies to a "work of visual art," which is
narrowly defined and which excludes, among other works, literary and
musical works. 92 Second, even as to "works of visual art," VARA only
applies to the original work or up to two hundred signed and numbered
copies of a painting, drawing, print, sculpture, or photographic image
that is "produced for exhibition purposes only., 93 Third, VARA excludes
from protection any works created under a work-made-for-hire arrange-
ment.94 Finally, VARA allows for waiver of the rights of attribution and
integrity.95
The limited scope of VARA was tolerable because, at the time,
other avenues existed to enforce the right of attribution, such as the
Lanham Act 96 and state misappropriation laws. 97 Since that time, the Su-
preme Court seems to have foreclosed the possibility of a creator main-
taining a federal cause of action for lack of attribution under the Lanham
90. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). When it considered VARA, Congress protested providing
similar moral rights protections to creators who participate in a collaborative effort, such as a motion
picture. H.R. REP. No. 101-514 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6918-19. Congress
was concerned about potential conflicts in the distribution and marketing of these works that might
arise, especially given that these creators generally do not own the economic rights to their work
because the works are created under a work-for-hire relationship. Id.
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). The statute includes as a "work of visual art" a "painting,
drawing, print, or sculpture" and a "still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only."
Id. The statute explicitly excludes from the definition of "work of visual art" the following:
(A)(1) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base,
electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering,
or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (I) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) Any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
Id.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id. § 106A(e)(1). A creator must expressly agree to a waiver in a written instrument that he
has signed. Id. Under a true moral rights scheme, waivers would not be recognized. Jane C. Gins-
burg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263,
300 (2004).
96. 15 U.S.C. § I 125(a)(1) (2000).
97. Janet Fries & Michael J. Remington, Beware of Mutant Copyright: Justice Scalia Issues a
Warning in the Dastar Decision, IP LAW & BUSINESS, Sept. 2003, at 70.
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Act. 98 In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. ,99 the Court,
relying on the dictionary definitions of "origin" and "goods," held that
the Lanham Act did not extend to protect the originator of ideas or
communications from false attribution. 0 0
Although there may be, as one court has termed it, "glimmers" of
moral rights recognition in the United States, 10 these glimmers are spo-
radic and dim. Some courts have shown a willingness to consider crea-
tors' rights and "favorably resolve questions about creators' interests in
attribution and artistic integrity."' 02 However, Congress has not estab-
lished an explicit moral rights provision, except in the limited area of the
visual arts covered under VARA. 10 3 Additionally, in Dastar, the Court
removed the possibility of trademark law as an avenue for creators to
demand attribution for their works. 10 4 In short, apart from VARA, no
federal law prohibits misattribution or recognizes the creator's right to
attribution
°.10 5
C. The Statutory Framework of Ownership
As discussed, the focus on an incentive rationale for copyright can
limit protection of a creator's nonpecuniary rights. Current copyright law
provisions can also fail to protect a creator's pecuniary rights. This sec-
tion examines the relevant statutory provisions concerning copyright
ownership, transfer of ownership, and standing to sue as a backdrop for
why a creator-assignee should have standing to sue for copyright
infringement.
Congress protects the Copyright Clause's "exclusive right" by
granting five exclusive rights to copyright owners. 0 6 The copyright
owner has the exclusive right to reproduce and authorize reproduction of
the work, to produce and authorize production of derivative works, to
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2005). The Lanham Act is the federal trademark statute.
99. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
100. Id. at 31-32. Lanham Act protection existed only for the source, that is, the producer of
the goods sold in the marketplace. Id.
10 1. Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 1997).
102. Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France
and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 994-95, n. 15 (1990).
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
104. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
105. Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1211
(2005) ("Yet contrary to the impression one might gain from reading the many judicial opinions that
conflate copyright infringement with plagiarism, there is actually no law prohibiting plagiarism and
misattribution generally.").
106. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). In contrast to the current statute, in the first copyright statute,
Congress granted to authors "the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending
[the copyrightable work]." Act of May 31, 1790, § 1, I Stat. 124.
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distribute and authorize distribution of the work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, to perform or authorize performance of the
work publicly, and to display or authorize display of the work pub-
licly. 10 7 The exercise of one of these exclusive rights without the permis-
sion of the owner of the particular right constitutes infringement.10 8
This broad grant of exclusive rights is increased further through the
current statute's divisibility provisions. 0 9 Under previous copyright stat-
utes, the copyright interest was indivisible. 10 The indivisibility doctrine
served to protect alleged infringers from harassment from multiple suits
charging infringement."' However, under the all-or-nothing approach of
indivisibility, the creator had no control over the use of his work if the
copyright was held by someone else."12 To protect their interests, creators
lobbied for divisible rights and were successful." 13
Because the exclusive rights are now divisible, the copyright owner
can transfer'14 any of the exclusive rights in whole or in part.' 15 The
owner of any particular exclusive right, or any part of an exclusive right,
is entitled to the protection and remedies provided in the copyright stat-
ute, including the right to bring an infringement action.' 16 The statute
does not specify any minimal portion of the exclusive right that must be
transferred in order to maintain an infringement action.' 17
Given the broad range of rights, copyright ownership can be very
valuable. Ownership "vests initially in the author or authors of the
work."1 8 However, one need not be the creator to be an "author." While
the Copyright Clause refers to an "exclusive right" granted to
"[a]uthors,"1 9 the statute does not define the term "author."'' 20 Moreover,
107. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2000).
108. Id. § 501(a).
109. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 201, 90 Stat. 2598 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §
201 (2000)).
110. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 28, at 106.
111. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 313 (5th ed. 2000).
112. H.R. 94-1476, 94th Cong. (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5738-39.
113. Id. (noting that the provision of divisibility of copyright had "long been sought by authors
and their representatives" and had "attracted wide support from other groups").
114. Copyright ownership can be transferred by "assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or
any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights
comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a
nonexclusive license." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
115. Id. § 201(d)(1). The "doctrine of indivisibility" generally was justified as necessary to
protect alleged infringers from harassment from multiple suits charging infringement. JOYCE ET AL.,
supra note I11.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2000).
117. Id. § 201.
118. Id. § 201(a).
119. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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few judicial decisions define "author.' 21 The Supreme Court has given a"general rule" definition of "author" as "the party who actually creates
the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible
expression entitled to copyright protection."' 2
This general rule-that an author is the party who creates the
work-is subject to the "work made for hire" exception. 23 The Supreme
Court first recognized the principle of the work-made-for-hire doctrine in
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 124 In Bleistein, the Court held
that an employer owned the copyrights of advertisements that an em-
ployee created in the scope of employment. 25 The Court stated the em-
ployer had the right to sue for infringement of the advertisements be-
cause the advertisements had "been produced by persons employed and
paid by the plaintiffs in their establishment to make those very things.' 26
Congress adopted this expansive view of ownership and revised the stat-
ute to grant authorship status to an employer of a creator in work-made-
for-hire relationship. 27
Congress viewed the work-made-for-hire provision as "one of the
basic principles of the present law,"' 12 and it included the provision in
the 1976 overhaul of the copyright statute. 29 The current statute provides
two alternative definitions for a "work made for hire."' 30 First, a work is
a work made for hire if it is "prepared by an employee within the scope
of his or her employment."' 3' Second, a work is a work made for hire if it
is "specially ordered or commissioned for use" as one of nine listed types
of work "if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Definitions" section of Copyright Act of 1976, which does
not include definition for "author"). In 1836, the copyright statute began to refer to grants of copy-
right to "proprietors" as well as "authors." See Copyright Act of 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
121. Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept ofAuthorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2003).
122. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
123. Id.
124. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
125. Id. at 248.
126. Id.
127. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
128. H.R. 94-1476, 94th Cong. § 121 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
129. Id. The current statute provides:
(b) Works Made for Hire. - - In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title,
and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).
130. Id. § 101.
131. Id.
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them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire." 132 Unless
the creator and employer agree otherwise in writing, the employer owns
the copyright of a work created in a work-made-for-hire relationship.133
111. STANDING TO SUE AND THE LEGAL RIGHT
GRANTED UNDER 17 U.S.C. § 501(b)
This Part begins with a brief overview of the constitutional re-
quirements for standing and discusses the role of standing in private liti-
gation. It continues with a review of the real party in interest require-
ments of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a). Finally, it concludes
with a review of the copyright statute's standing provision, 17 U.S.C.
§ 501(b).
A. The Constitutional Requirements and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)
While the doctrine of standing is generally more tied to "litigation
asserting the illegality of governmental action," 134 any discussion of
standing should begin with a review of the constitutional prerequisites. 135
Standing is a threshold issue and is "the determination of whether a spe-
cific person is the proper party to bring a matter to the court for adjudica-
tion.' 36 The standing doctrine derives from the Court's interpretation of
Article III, 137 which limits the scope of federal judicial power to "cases"
and "controversies."' 38 The impetus behind the doctrine is efficiency.
Because of various burdens on the court system, the doctrine serves to
avoid unnecessary judicial decisions by limiting the class of plaintiffs
allowed to bring a claim.' 39
The Supreme Court has recognized three constitutional prerequi-
sites for standing: injury, causation, and redressability. 40 First, the plain-
tiff must allege that he suffered an "injury in fact" that is "concrete and
132. Id. The nine named categories are "as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas." Id.
133. Id. § 201(b).
134. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531, at 340-41 (2006 supp.).
135. Indeed, commentators have called it "misleading" to call the jurisprudence concerning
who is allowed to bring a suit for copyright infringement a "standing" doctrine. See Roger D. Blair
& Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law, 74 TUL.
L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2000).
136. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 60 (2002).
137. Id. at 62.
138. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.
139. 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 134, § 3531.3, at 407.
140. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).
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particularized" and "actual or imminent.' 14 1 Second, the plaintiff must
allege that such injury is "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant."' 142 Finally, the plaintiff must allege that the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision. 143 In a copyright infringement case,
a plaintiff should be able to satisfy the constitutional requirements by
alleging the defendant's unauthorized use of one, or a part of one, of the
exclusive rights of the copyright.1
44
Because copyright infringement cases generally involve private par-
ties, the standing prerequisites are less demanding. This is because
"[c]laims of private wrongdoing ordinarily are asserted by persons obvi-
ously having the enforceable interest." 145 In such private actions, stand-
ing to sue is normally resolved through defining the cause of action or
identifying the real party in interest. 146 Thus, the Article III requirement
can be fulfilled "solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing."'' 47 In copyright law, the statute that
defines the cause of action is 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).
148
In addition to the standing requirement, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require that the plaintiff be the "real party in interest."' 149 This
rule provides as follows:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of
an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized
by statute may sue in that person's own name without joining the
party for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute
of the United States so provides, an action for the use or benefit
of another shall be brought in the name of the United States. 5 °
This requirement works to "identify the person who possesses the
right sought to be enforced.' 15' It serves claim preclusion purposes by
preventing a defendant from being subject to subsequent similar actions
141. Id. An injury is "particularized" if the defendant's action has affected the plaintiff in a
"personal and individual way." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.l (1992).
142. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180.
143. Id. at 181.
144. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000).
145. 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 134, § 3531, at 341.
146. Id. at 339.
147. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (citation omitted).
148. See discussion infra Part III.B.
149. FED. R. CIv. P. 17(a).
150. Id.
151. 6A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 24, at § 1542.
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by someone not a party to the original litigation. 52 While the real party
in interest requirement is mandatory, courts have construed it liberally. 53
To satisfy the requirement, the plaintiff must be the person "who,
according to the governing substantive law, is entitled to enforce the
right."' 154 In a copyright infringement action, 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) provides
that a "legal or beneficial owner" possesses the enforceable right.
Thus, in copyright infringement cases, the standing and real party in
interest requirements are essentially conflated. Both inquiries are con-
cerned with whether a plaintiff has sufficient interest in the action, 55 and
both inquiries are answered by the same underlying provision, 17 U.S.C.
§ 501(b).
B. The Requirements of l7 U.S. C. § 501(b)
While the 1909 Act allowed only the "proprietor" of a copyright to
sue for infringement, 156 the current copyright statute has expanded the
class of plaintiffs. The current copyright act does not use the term "pro-
prietor." Rather, Congress chose the term "legal or beneficial owner" to
establish who could maintain an infringement action.'57 The statute does
not define "beneficial owner."'158 The only guidance Congress provided
152. Pacific Coast Agric. Exp. Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir.
1975).
153. 6A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 24, at § 1541.
154. Id. at § 1543.
155. 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 134 (standing); 6A WRIGHT, MILLER &
KANE, supra note 24 (real party in interest). Of course, there are differences. Standing is a limit on
the court's subject matter jurisdiction and, unlike the real party in interest requirement, cannot be
waived. Id.
156. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. "If any person shall infringe the copyright
in any work protected under the copyright laws of the United States such person shall be liable ... to
pay to the copyright proprietor such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to
the infringement... " 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1909). A proprietor could include an exclusive licensee.
See, e.g., Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 611 (D.N.Y. 1950). In interpreting the 1909 Act,
the courts also allowed an exclusive licensee and an assignee to sue; however, an exclusive licensee
was required to join the copyright owner. Nathan v. Monthly Review Press, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). Because of the indivisibility doctrine, to be an assignee, one had to receive all of
the rights in the copyright. Id.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000). This section provides in full:
The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled, subject
to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for any infringement of that par-
ticular right committed while he or she is the owner of it. The court may require such
owner to serve written notice of the action with a copy of the complaint upon any person
shown, by the records of the Copyright Office or otherwise, to have or claim an interest
in the copyright, and shall require that such notice be served upon any person whose in-
terest is likely to be affected by a decision in the case. The court may require the joinder,
and shall permit the intervention, of any person having or claiming an interest in the
copyright.
158. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
Seattle University Law Review
for whom would be considered a "beneficial owner" lies in the legisla-
tive history.159 According to Congress, a "beneficial owner" would "in-
clude, for example, an author who had parted with legal title to the
copyright in exchange for percentage royalties based on sales or license
fees."160
Even though Congress provided only an example of whom might
be a beneficial owner, the courts have limited the class of beneficial
owners to this example. Courts have tied the concept of beneficial own-
ership to whether the plaintiff has an economic interest in the copyright.
For example, in Cortner v. Israel,16' the composers of the theme to
ABC's Monday Night Football assigned the copyright title to ABC in
exchange for royalties. 162 Because the parties anticipated that ABC
would use the theme and would be obligated to pay royalties to the com-
posers, the court found the parties had an equitable trust relationship. 163
Due to this equitable trust relationship, the court held that the composers
were "beneficial owners" of the copyright with standing to sue for
infringement. 164
Courts have not strayed from the equitable trust notion of beneficial
ownership and have refused to expand beneficial ownership to creators
engaged in a work-made-for-hire relationship unless they have a royalty
arrangement, separate from their compensation, with the copyright
owner. For example, in Moran v. London Records, Ltd., Larry Moran, a
professional commercial announcer, brought an infringement action
against the musical group Bronski Beat. 65 Moran alleged that Bronski
Beat incorporated Moran's recorded performance from a Kibbles 'N Bits
dog food commercial into one of the band's songs without Moran's per-
mission. 166 While Moran's contract to create the commercial recording
transferred the copyright to his employer, Moran had retained the right to
require his employer to bargain and agree with him before allowing an-
other use of the recording.' 67 Moran argued this retained right made him
159. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 159 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5775.
160. Id.
161. 732 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1984).
162. Id. at 269.
163. Id. at 271.
164. Id. The court was unclear as to whether the 1909 Act or 1976 Act applied to the case. Id.
However, the court believed this was immaterial because the 1976 Act "merely codified the case law
that had developed under the 1909 Act with respect to the beneficial owner's standing to sue." Id.
See also Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (song-
writer who transferred copyright to music company in exchange for royalties is the beneficial
owner).
165. 827 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1987).
166. Id. at 181-82.
167. Id. at 181.
456 [Vol. 30:437
Creator-Assignee Standing
a beneficial owner of the copyright. 68 The court disagreed, basing its
decision on the lack of any case law granting beneficial ownership to a
creator in a work-made-for-hire relationship and the royalty example
provided in the legislative history on beneficial ownership. 69
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar result in
Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc. 170 In that case, Richard Warren
contracted to compose music for the television series Remington
Steele.171 Under his contract, Warren created the music in exchange for
royalty payments representing a percentage of the sales of the broadcast
rights.1 72 After finding that the agreement created a work-made-for-hire
173 1 74relationship,173 the court held that Warren was not a beneficial owner.
The court relied on the reasoning in Moran and the work-made-for-hire
provisions. 175 Specifically, the court noted that a work-made-for-hire re-
lationship did not result in an assignment of ownership to the employer,
but an initial vesting of ownership in the employer. 176 Furthermore, the
presence of a royalty arrangement as part of the agreement, "absent an
express contractual provision to the contrary," did not create beneficial
ownership. 177 Therefore, absent an express provision granting beneficial
ownership to creators, a creator in a work-made-for-hire relationship
cannot rely on beneficial ownership to create standing.
IV. THE ASSIGNEE'S STANDING TO SUE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Before asserting that a creator-assignee should have standing to sue
for copyright infringement, a review of the general rules of assignee
standing in copyright law is essential. This section begins with a review
of those general rules and then discusses creator-assignee standing using
the recent case Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.' 78
168. Id. at 182.
169. Id. at 183. According to the court,
Given that no case has held an employee in a work made for hire situation to be a benefi-
cial owner, and that Congress merely intended to codify the existing case law .... the fact
that Congress did give only the assignment example supports the conclusion that Con-
gress did not intend to extend the concept of beneficial ownership to include an employee
in a work made for hire arrangement.
Id.
170. 328 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2003).
171. Id. at 1138.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1140-43.
174. Id. at 1145.
175. Id. at 1144.
176. Id. at 1145.
177. Id.
178. 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Courts have generally decided whether an assignee of an accrued
cause of action has standing to sue based upon the timing of the assign-
ment. The rule is that only an assignor has standing to sue for
infringement that occurred prior to the assignment. 179 However, this rule
can be overcome if the right to bring a prior-accrued infringement action
is expressly included in the assignment.' 80 Additionally, at least one dis-
trict court has held that an assignment of copyright includes the assign-
ment of any accrued causes of action even in the absence of an express
provision regarding the accrued cause of action.181
In a case arising under the 1909 Act, Prather v. Neva Paperbacks,
Inc.,' 82 the court granted an assignee standing to sue for infringement that
occurred prior to the assignment because the assignment clearly con-
veyed any accrued causes of action. The assignment provided, "This as-
signment includes ... any and all causes of action that may have hereto-
fore accrued in [assignor's] favor for infringement of said copyright."'' 83
In granting standing, the court relied on the clear and precise terms of the
assignment, the lack of public policy prohibiting the
assignment, and the assignee's satisfaction of the real party in interest
requirements. 184
The Prather court's holding is significant for several reasons. As
discussed, the court did not tie standing to whether the assignee owned
any interest in the copyright at the time of the infringement.' 5 Further,
the court allowed standing even though the copyright owner retained an
exclusive license and the case arose under the 1909 Copyright Act. 1 86
Given the indivisibility provisions of the prior Act and the Act's
requirement that the "proprietor" bring any infringement action, the
copyright owner's retention of an exclusive license should have defeated
standing. 187
179. Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C&C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
180. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1990).
181. Custom Dcor, Inc. v. Nautical Crafts, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 154, 156-57 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(assignee had standing even though infringement occurred several months before written assign-
ment).
182. 410 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1969).
183. Id. at 699 n.1.
184. Id. at 700; see also ABKCO Music, 944 F.2d at 980-81 (assignee has standing to bring
actions for infringement committed while it was copyright owner and actions for infringements that
had been committed before and after transfer of ownership because assignment was express pur-
chase of those rights).
185. Prather, 410 F.2d at 700.
186. Id. (because the assignee received assignment of "all choses in action for infringement,"
assignee had standing).
187. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 908 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bea, J.,
dissenting).
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The Ninth Circuit recently confronted the issue of whether a creator
who receives an assignment of an accrued cause of action without receiv-
ing an assignment of any other ownership interest has standing to sue. In
Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., 18 a case of first impression,
Nancey Silvers, the screenplay writer for The Other Woman, a made-for-
television movie, brought an infringement action against Sony Pictures
Entertainment.18 9 Silvers alleged that Sony's movie, Stepmom, was sub-
stantially similar to The Other Woman. 190 Silvers had created the screen-
play for The Other Woman in a work-for-hire relationship. 9 After the
alleged infringement, Silvers obtained from her employer an "Assign-
ment of Claims and Causes of Action" that assigned to her "all right, title
and interest in and to any claims and causes of action against Sony Pic-
tures Entertainment, Inc., Columbia Tri-Star and any other appropriate
persons or entities with respect to the screenplay 'The Other Woman'...
and the motion picture 'Stepmom.,,"192 The assignment did not include
any other interest in the copyright. 93
When Silvers brought an action for infringement against Sony,
Sony moved to dismiss the action, arguing that Silvers did not have
standing. 194 Sony argued that an ownership interest in the copyright was
required for standing and that receipt of an assignment of an accrued
cause of action for infringement did not vest any ownership interest in
the assignee. 95 Although the district court and circuit court panel denied
Sony's motion to dismiss,' 96 the Ninth Circuit voted to review the case
en banc197 and subsequently reversed.' 98 The court held that Silvers did
188. Id.
189. Id. at 883.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 330 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2003). The panel based its
decision on the terms of the assignment; the language of § 501(b); the lack of any prohibition against
assignment of causes of action in the copyright statute; the doctrine of divisibility; and the lack of
any potential that Sony would be subject to multiple suits. Id. at 1206. First, the court noted that the
assignment to Ms. Silvers was in clear and precise terms. Id. at 1207. Second, the court stated that
the language of § 501(b) did not limit the class of plaintiffs in infringement actions only to legal or
beneficial owners. Id. at 1208. Rather, the court noted that the language of § 501 (b) merely indicates
that the right accrues, it does not prohibit an assignment of the accrued cause of action. Id. Third, the
court reasoned that the accrued cause of action was just one of the rights in the bundle of copyright
ownership that was divisible and could be owned separately. Id. Finally, the court opined that be-
cause the assignment included any and all causes of action for infringement, Sony should not be
subject to subsequent suits regarding the same claim of infringement. Id. at 1209.
197. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 370 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2004).
198. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890 (9th Cir. 2005).
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not have standing to sue because she did not have an ownership interest
in the copyright at the time she filed the lawsuit.' 99
The Silvers majority based its ruling on what it perceived to be the
unambiguous language of § 501(b), the temporal requirement in
§ 501(b), and on application of the canon of statutory construction of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.20 0 First, the court stated that the lan-
guage of § 501 (b) was clear. The statute granted standing to only legal or
beneficial owners of one of the exclusive rights (or a divisible part of one
of the exclusive rights).2°' Second, the court construed a temporal re-
quirement in the statute, that is, the legal or beneficial owner had to own
the copyright at the time of the alleged infringement in order to have
standing.20 2 Finally, reviewing the exclusive rights enumerated in § 106,
the court asserted that the list was exhaustive and the right to bring an
action for infringement was not one of the listed rights.20 3
Although the majority believed the statutory mandate was clear, it
looked outside the statute to bolster its holding. The majority dismissed
the idea that a cause of action was separately assignable because of the
divisibility doctrine. 20 4 According to the majority, such a rule was con-
trary to the legislative intent because it believed Congress intended that
only owners of an exclusive right could bring suit. 20 5 Under the major-
ity's view, an accrued cause of action is not a divisible part of any of the
exclusive rights. Furthermore, because of the "strong connection"
between copyright and patent law, the court adopted the patent law prin-
ciple that a bare assignment could not give rise to a patent infringement
cause of action. °6
Under the majority's rule, the class of potential plaintiffs permitted
to bring a claim for copyright infringement would be limited to parties
199. Id.
200. Id. at 883-87. The canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius creates a presumption
that "when a statute designates certain persons, things, or manners of operation, all omissions should
be understood as exclusions." Id. at 885 (quoting Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756-57 (9th
Cir. 1991)).
201. Id. at 884.
202. Id. at 885.
203. Id. at 886-87. If a right is not "specified," then it is not one of the exclusive rights granted
by Congress. Id. at 887 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674).
204. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890 (9th Cir. 2005).
205. Id. "Although Congress allowed for divisibility of ownership interests under a copyright,
it did not alter the requirement that only owners of an exclusive right in the copyright could bring
suit." Id. at 886.
206. Id. at 887-88 (discussing Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261
U.S. 24, 26, 33-35 (1923)). However, at least one commentator has noted that copyright standing
rules, since the adoption of the 1976 Act and its divisibility doctrine, allow "option[s] that appear to
be impossible in patent law." Blair & Cotter, supra note 135, at 1369.
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with an ownership interest in one of the exclusive rights. Under this rule,
a creator who owns an assignment of an accrued claim of copyright in-
fringement involving his own work cannot rely on that assignment to
grant him standing. Rather, the creator must obtain an express agreement
from his employer abrogating the work-made-for-hire relationship and
granting the creator ownership of the copyright or one of the exclusive
rights as well as the accrued cause of action.
The majority's reversal of the panel decision was met with two
strong dissenting opinions in which four judges objected to the major-
ity's construction of the statute20 7 and its adoption of patent law princi-
ples.20 8 Additionally, the dissenters discredited the majority's assertion
that a simple reading of § 501(b) resolved the issue because assignment
of an infringement cause of action was not addressed in the statute.20 9
The dissenters also disagreed with the majority's reliance on patent law
given the doctrinal differences-in particular divisibility of ownership-
in these two areas.210 While both dissenting opinions agreed that the ma-
jority's reliance on the plain meaning of the statutory language and reli-
ance on principles of patent law were misplaced, the two opinions
diverged on how far the standing doctrine should be extended. One
opinion asserted that any assignee of an accrued cause of action for
copyright infringement should be allowed standing, while the other sug-
gested allowing standing for creator-assignees only.2 t
V. A CREATOR-ASSIGNEE OF AN ACCRUED CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT SHOULD HAVE STANDING TO SUE
Contrary to the court's holding in Silvers, a creator-assignee should
have standing to sue. This Part presents three arguments to support grant-
ing standing to a creator-assignee. First, a creator-assignee should have
standing to sue because the legislative intent and statutory language en-
courage divisibility and alienability of the exclusive rights of copyright.
Second, a creator-assignee satisfies the standing and real party in interest
prerequisites. Finally, allowing a creator-assignee standing to sue
207. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 890-96, 911.
208. Id. at 894-95, 903-05.
209. Id. at 891, 896.
210. Id. at 894-95,903-05.
211. Id. at 891 (Berzon, J., dissenting) According to Judge Berzon,
I part company with Judge Bea, however, at the point at which he suggests that an
entirely free market for accrued causes of action in copyright is the proper antidote to the
majority's preclusion of effective transfer of such accrued causes of action .... Instead, I
would hold that Silvers, given her status as the original creator of the contested "work-
for-hire," may pursue the accrued claims assigned by Frank & Bob Films, while a com-
plete stranger to the creative process could not.
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advances the economic and non-economic rationales underlying the con-
stitutional goal of copyright protection.
A. Congress Intended the Exclusive Rights of
Copyright to be Completely Divisible and Alienable
Allowing a creator-assignee standing to sue effectuates Congress's
intent. First, the statutory language is clear: Congress intended for the
exclusive rights of copyright to be fully divisible and transferable.
Second, the divisibility doctrine was designed to benefit creators. Third,
congressional silence regarding prohibitions on assignability of accrued
claims implies support for such a rule. This is particularly true given that
courts have treated an assignment of the accrued cause of action as a
separate stick in the bundle of rights. Finally, the Silvers court's reliance
on patent law is misplaced.
First, a reading of the plain language of the Copyright Act shows
that the exclusive rights of copyright are completely divisible and alien-
able.21 2 In contrast to the 1909 Act, the current Act allows for divisibility
of the rights without limitation.1 3 The language regarding transfer and
divisibility of copyright ownership is plain:
(d) Transfer of Ownership.-
(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in
whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by opera-
tion of law ....
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright,
including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by
section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1)
and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclu-
sive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the
protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner
by this title.214
Thus, a copyright owner is free to transfer any part of any of the ex-
clusive rights. Preventing a copyright owner from transferring an accrued
cause of action frustrates the owner's statutory right to freely contract for
transfer of his rights.
Second, the divisibility doctrine serves to protect the bargaining
power of creators. 215 Creators fought for divisibility of ownership to
212. See discussion supra Part 1.C.
213. See discussion supra Part I.C.
214. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 109-113.
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allow more control over the use of their works.21 6 Generally, creators
suffer from unequal bargaining power because "aspiring authors are gen-
erally impecunious and legally unsophisticated" compared to the "estab-
lished industry players" who are "secure veterans of the process., 21 7 If
the positions of the parties change, then the creator should not be denied
the opportunity to purchase any portion of the exclusive rights. If a copy-
right owner wishes not to pursue a suit for infringement, then the creator,
who has annexed a fragment of her world, should be allowed to pursue
such an action by purchasing an assignment of the cause of action. If
courts allow a creator to purchase the accrued cause of action and grant
standing to the creator-assignee, the policy behind the divisibility
doctrine is served.
Third, congressional silence may imply that Congress intended for
creator-assignees to have standing to sue. Nothing in the current copy-
right statute forbids assignment of the accrued cause of action.21 8 Ironi-
cally, the only restriction on alienability in the copyright statute is con-
tained in VARA's restriction on transfers and waivers of the rights of
attribution and integrity granted to creators of works of visual art.219
Congress unequivocally intended that the exclusive rights be completely
divisible and alienable. 220 Because Congress provided no limit on divisi-
bility and transferability of the exclusive rights, courts should not read an
exception into the statute.
Finally, as the dissenters in Silvers noted, it is erroneous to import
the standing requirement of patent law into copyright law.22' Although
the Supreme Court has previously applied patent provisions to copyright
law, it only has done so when addressing issues concerning the adequate
protection of the limited-term monopolies granted through patent and
copyright.22 2 Because "there are substantial differences between the
patent and copyright laws," 223 the Silvers majority's reliance on patent
law is flawed. This is especially true in the standing inquiry. In patent
law, the owner of the patent is an indispensable party to an infringement
216. See supra text accompanying notes 112-113.
217. See Lastowka, supra note 105, at 1217. However, Lastowka argues that the unequal bar-
gaining relationship between creators and the publishers and distributors of works is a reason not to
recognize a right of attribution via copyright law. Id. at 1217-18.
218. See Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, 402 F.3d 881, 902 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bea, J. dissent-
ing).
219. See supra 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (2000).
220. See supra text accompanying note 113.
221. Silvers, 402 F.3d at 894-95 (Berzon, J. dissenting); id. at 904-05 (Bea, J. dissenting).
222. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)
(adopting the patent law's staple article of commerce doctrine to analyze whether consumers' use of
Betamax equipment constituted contributory infringement).
223. Id.
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suit.224 Additionally, courts have interpreted patent law to recognize a
prudential limitation that an exclusive licensee who does not have all of
the substantial patent rights has standing only if the licensee meets the
Article III requirements (injury, causation, and redressability) and the
licensee sues "in the name of, and jointly with, the patent owner."2 5
These provisions exist because of the concern for potential multiplicity
of suits. By contrast, copyright law expressly addresses the potential for
22multiplicity of suits through joinder and notice requirements. 26 Third,
copyright law recognizes the doctrine of divisibility while patent law
does not.227 Finally, as a practical matter, in infringement cases, copy-
rights are invalidated less frequently than patents are-over half of all
patents are invalidated in litigation.228 Because of these differences, the
rules for standing to bring a claim for patent infringement are, and should
be, more stringent.
In sum, Congress provided for unlimited divisibility of the exclu-
sive rights of copyright. Not allowing a creator to contract with the copy-
right owner for an assignment of an accrued cause of action subverts the
clear language of the statute and the policies underlying the divisibility
doctrine.
B. The Creator-Assignee Satisfies the Standing and
Real Party in Interest Requirements
While the infringement action is freely transferable under the
statute, it is doubtful that every potential assignee of the cause of action
would satisfy the standing and real party in interest prerequisites to bring
a suit. However, a creator-assignee would satisfy these prerequisites for
four reasons. First, the creator-assignee would satisfy the constitutional
requirements for standing. Second, the creator-assignee would qualify as
a legal owner thereby fulfilling the statutory standing requirements.
Third, limiting standing to a creator-assignee, as opposed to an assignee
with no tie to the subject work, addresses the efficiency concerns
224. Indep. Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 269 U.S. 459, 468 (1926).
225. Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2001). The court has recognized an exception. Id. When the patent owner is the alleged in-
fringer, then the licensee is not required to sue in the name of the patentee. Id.
226. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000) provides, in part:
The court may require [the legal or beneficial] owner to serve written notice of the action
with a copy of the complaint upon any person shown, by the records of the Copyright Of-
fice or otherwise, to have or claim an interest in the copyright, and shall require that such
notice be served upon any person whose interest is likely to be affected by a decision in
the case. The court may require the joinder, and shall permit the intervention, of any per-
son having or claiming an interest in the copyright.
227. See id. § 201(d).
228. Blair & Cotter, supra note 135, at 1381.
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underlying the standing doctrine. Finally, a creator-assignee meets the
procedural requirements to be a real party in interest.
The creator-assignee satisfies the constitutional requirements for
standing. The constitutional requirements are injury, causation, and
redressability. 229 The alleged infringement would cause the creator-
assignee to suffer an injury in fact. The infringer's unauthorized use of
one of, or a part of, the exclusive rights of copyright may damage the
creator-assignee's finances or reputation. Because the creator-assignee is
denied credit for her work, her professional reputation is damaged.23 °
Additionally, by being denied the opportunity to claim the infringing
work as her own, the creator-assignee may lose opportunities for future
work. Furthermore, if sales of the creator-assignee's work are diminished
due to the infringing work, she would suffer financial damage. These
scenarios represent just a few of the possible injuries a creator-assignee
may suffer due to infringement.
The creator-assignee should also be able to satisfy the causation and
redressability prongs. To establish causation, the creator-assignee would
need to tie the financial and reputation damage to infringement. Based on
the injury suffered, the creator-assignee would need to seek the appropri-
ate remedy. Copyright law provides several revenue avenues including
injunctive relief,23' actual damages consisting of lost profits on sales or
lost royalties, 232 profits, 233 statutory damages, 234 and impounding and
destruction of infringing articles.235 A creator-assignee would need to
tailor the remedy sought to her alleged injury. For example, if the crea-
tor-assignee created the work in a work-made-for-hire position and was
paid for her work through a royalty arrangement (e.g., the creator in
Warren),236 then the creator should be able to maintain an infringement
action and seek lost royalties.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 140-44.
230. In a patent case, the Federal Circuit opined that the reputational value might satisfy the
Article Ill requirement of injury. Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) Repu-
tational interest alone may be sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of Article III standing. That assertion is not implausible. After
all, being considered an inventor of important subject matter is a mark of success in one's
field, comparable to being an author of an important scientific paper. Pecuniary conse-
quences may well flow from being designated as an inventor.
Id.
231. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
232. Id. § 504(b).
233. Id.
234. Id. § 504(c).
235. Id. § 503(a).
236. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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Furthermore, the creator-assignee should satisfy the statutory stand-
ing provisions. Under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), a "legal or beneficial owner"
is entitled to bring an action for infringement. 237 Because the exclusive
rights are freely divisible and an accrued cause of action can be a part of
one of the rights,238 the statutory standing requirements are eased.239 An
assignee of an accrued cause of action would satisfy the requirements of
§ 501(b). Reading the divisibility and standing provisions together, a
creator-assignee should have standing under the statute.
While Congress expanded the class of plaintiffs, limiting standing
to only creator-assignees addresses the efficiency concerns underlying
the standing doctrine. Considerable debate exists on how restrictive
standing to sue should be. Proponents of a liberalized standing doctrine
argue that it would "lead to a fuller exposition of all issues, 240 while
those arguing for a more restrictive standing doctrine assert efficiency
concerns. 24 By limiting judicial review to cases brought by parties with
more than just an ideological stake in the outcome, standing promotes
judicial efficiency by reducing judicial workloads and eliminating the
potential for unnecessary decisions that might make bad law.242
In every case a range of potential plaintiffs exists, from a
Hohfeldian plaintiff to a private attorney general.24 3 The Hohfeldian
plaintiff "has 'the personal and proprietary interest of the traditional
plaintiff.' ' 244 In contrast to the Hohfeldian plaintiff, a private attorney
general seeks to enforce the public interest, not his own interest.245
Because the creator's personality marks her work, a creator whose work
has been infringed should have the necessary personal and proprietary
interest of a Hohfeldian plaintiff. Conversely, a mere purchaser of an
accrued cause of action who had no other ties to the underlying work
237. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13, 182-86.
239. 6A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 24, § 1547 (The 1976 Act "greatly eases stand-
ing to sue and real party in interest problems in copyright cases by allowing the transfer in whole or
in part of an exclusive right and then according the owners of any such rights all the remedies pro-
vided for under the Act.").
240. Michael C. Jensen et al., The Case for Restricting Access to Courts 7-8 (Grad. Sch. of
Mgmt. Univ. of Rochester, Working Paper No. MERC 81-06, 1981), available at http:l/papers.
ssm.com/abstract=618765.
241. Id. at 2.
242. See id. at 21 ("[l]f the standing rule allows court access to non-injured parties or parties
subject only to injuries from value effects, the rights system that results will be one that creates
externalities, closes markets, acts to prevent the elimination of inefficiencies, and reduces aggregate
welfare.").
243. Id. at 6.
244. Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119 n.5 (1968) (Harlan, J. dissenting)).
245. Id.; see also Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 893-94 (9th Cir. 2005)
("Silvers has a significant interest in the infringement as she was the original creator.").
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would be similar to a private attorney general. Such an assignee would
not possess sufficient personal stake in the case and should be denied
standing.
Finally, the creator-assignee would satisfy the real party in interest
requirement. To qualify as a real party in interest, the plaintiff must be
the person "who, according to the governing substantive law, is entitled
to enforce the right."246 In a copyright infringement action, the governing
substantive law, § 501(b), provides that a "legal or beneficial owner"
possesses the right to have the copyright enforced.24 7 Because the exclu-
sive rights are freely divisible and transferable, the real party in interest
inquiry, like the statutory standing inquiry, is straightforward and nets
the same result. 248 A creator-assignee as owner of a divisible part of one
of the exclusive rights meets the requirements of § 501(b).249
Thus, in copyright infringement cases, the standing and real party in
interest requirements are essentially conflated. Both inquiries are
concerned with whether a plaintiff has sufficient interest in the action,25°
and both inquiries are answered by the same underlying statute.
C. Allowing a Creator-Assignee Standing
to Sue Advances Constitutional Goals
Not only does granting standing to a creator-assignee conform with
the statute and satisfy the standing and real party in interest requirements,
but it also advances constitutional goals. Copyright law exists to fulfill
two constitutional goals: promoting progress and protecting a creator's
rights.2 5 1 Allowing a creator-assignee standing to sue would fulfill these
constitutional goals without undermining the economic and non-
economic justifications behind these goals.
To promote progress, copyright law exists, in part, to incentivize
the creation of new works through the grant of proprietary rights.22 Even
the current Court's view of copyright primarily as economic regulation 251
implicitly acknowledges the need for a certain degree of financial
246. 6A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 24, § 1543.
247. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2000).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 149-155.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 237-239.
250. See supra text accompanying note 155. The fact that an assignee is bringing the cause of
action is immaterial. An assignee of an accrued infringement action steps into the shoes of the as-
signor in order to prosecute the claim. See Infodek, Inc. v. Meredith Webb Printing Co., 830 F.
Supp. 614, 619-21 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
251. See discussion supra Part l.B.
252. See discussion supra Part lI.B.I. The incentive rationale overlooks the fact that many
creators would and do create, even in the absence of incentives.
253. Ruth L. Okediji, Through the Years: The Supreme Court and the Copyright Clause, 30
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1633, 1638 (2004).
2007]
Seattle University Law Review
protection for creators.254 If courts grant creator-assignees standing to sue
for infringement, then creator-assignees would be able to protect their
pecuniary and nonpecuniary interests in their works. Such a rule will
help foster a culture of creativity because creators will feel secure know-
ing that the integrity of their works will be protected. By protecting a
creator's interests in the work, the law will encourage production of
works thereby enriching the cultural heritage and serving the constitu-
tional goal of progress.255
Granting creator-assignees standing would also advance the consti-
tutional goal of protecting a creator's rights. Unfortunately, the current
copyright law fails to adequately protect creators. The notion of an indi-
vidual as the author and, as a result, copyright owner, has diminished.
The granting of copyrights to an employer under the work-made-for-hire
doctrine has only exacerbated the problem. 256 As one commentator has
noted, the current system has "transform[ed] real creators into modern-
day sharecroppers.', 257 Indeed, the role of current copyright law is "less
and less to support creativity, and more and more to protect certain in-
dustries against competition., 258 As a result, current copyright law has
become less beneficial for creators while "substantially more beneficial
for cultural conglomerates., 259 This is due, in part, to the tremendous
influence of the content industry in the legislative process. 6°
One approach to rectify the current system would be through the
recognition of moral rights. In fact, as a signatory to the Berne Conven-
tion, the United States has a duty to provide protection for a creator's
right of attribution and right of integrity.26' One commentator has cast
this duty as a moral duty and argued:
The United States has joined the Beme Convention primarily for the
sake of moral leadership in the world copyright community. Yet by
254. See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 71, at 996 (discussing the right of attribution). Unlike in-
fringement, the right of attribution is more concerned with the creator's dignity, personality, and
reputational interests. Id. However, both are concerned with protecting a creator's interests in his
work. In fact, some countries link a violation of the right of attribution with a violation of the eco-
nomic right of copyright. See Ginsburg, supra note 95, at 299.
255. Ginsburg, supra note 121, at 1063; see also Kwall, supra note 67, at 70.
256. See discussion supra Part II.C.
257. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 262 (2004).
258. Id. at 19.
259. Marieke van Schijndel & Joost Smiers, Imagining a World Without Copyright (2005),
http://www.culturelink.org/news/members/2005/Smiers Copyright.pdf.
260. Niels Schaumann, Copyright, Containers, and the Court: A Reply to Professor Leaffer, 30
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1617, 1619 (2004) ("It is literally the case that Congress has for the most
part delegated its lawmaking authority to the content industry.").
261. See discussion supra Part ll.B.2.b.
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its minimalist approach, the United States leaves itself open to the
charge that it is failing to comply with some very important Berne
provisions. Prudential behavior dictates that, in order to reap the
benefits that flow from appearing to be moral, the U.S. must under-
take activities that will be perceived as moral.262
The United States has a good faith duty to honor its treaty commit-
ments. If we ignore the requirements of the Berne Convention, it would
be hypocritical to fault any other country for doing the same. Unfortu-
nately, whether the United States has taken steps sufficient to be
perceived as moral is questionable.
It was a "stretch" to say U.S. laws complied with the Berne Con-
vention when the United States adopted the BCIA and joined the Berne
Convention. 263 The Berne Convention requires protection of creators'
rights of attribution and integrity even after the creator transfers
ownership of his work. 64 However, at the time the United States joined
the Bere Convention, copyright law did not protect these rights, but a
congressional commission assured Congress that other legal provisions,
such as federal trademark law, did.265 In any event, to help harmonize
U.S. law with the laws of other Berne countries, Congress adopted
VARA,2 66 which provides limited moral rights protection.26 7
While using trademark law to pursue violations of the creator's at-
tribution right may not have been the best alternative, prior to the Court's
decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 268 it did
afford creators some protection. 269 The Dastar decision and the lower
courts' decisions after Dastar have removed this option. In Dastar, the
Court overlooked any issues regarding Berne compliance 270 and elimi-
nated the possibility of trademark law as an avenue for creators to de-
mand attribution for their works.2 7' While the work that was the subject
of the claim in Dastar had fallen into the public domain, subsequent
262. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8D.02[D][2] (emphasis in the original) (footnotes
omitted).
263. See Nimmer, supra note 70, at 20.
264. Berne Convention, supra note 9, at art. 6bis.
265. Nimmer, supra note 70, at 20; see discussion supra Part II.B.2.b.
266. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, tit. III (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6920
(The purpose of VARA was to bring United States law "into greater harmony with laws of other
Berne countries .... Enactment of moral rights legislation serves another important Berne objec-
tive-that of harmonizing national copyright laws.").
267. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.c.
268. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
269. See discussion supra Part l1.B.2.b.
270. See Schaumann, supra note 260, at 1631 (in Dastar, the "Court was willing ... to over-
look international [Berne] issues.").
271. Id. at 1630.
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courts have expanded Dastar to cover copyrighted works. In fact, lower
courts have seized upon the language in Dastar to find that trademark
law is no longer a viable option for redress of attribution claims.2 72 The
effect of Dastar has been to license plagiarism.
Despite the adoption of VARA, given the result in Dastar, U.S.
compliance with the Berne Convention is still questionable. 27 3 With the
exception of VARA, no federal law prohibits misattribution and recog-
nizes the creator's right to attribution.274 Furthermore, both the Court275
and commentators 276 have viewed the VARA limitations as evidence that
Congress intended no other moral rights protection.
While adoption of a right of attribution would benefit creators and
honor our treaty obligations, it could also be problematic. Adoption of a
right of attribution would acknowledge the creator's value in society and
serve to provide an incentive for the creation of new works.277
However, the main issue to resolve in formulating such a right
would be the scope of it. What amount of contribution to a work is
required for the right to arise? Trying to craft a law that incorporates
every credit requirement necessary would be extremely difficult. 27 8
Would such a right apply in the work-made-for-hire situation? 279 Under a
true moral rights scheme, the creator would be recognized as the author
272. See, e.g., Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131 (5th Cir. 2004) (dismissing
Lanham Act claim for alleged copying of software); Zyla v. Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243 (lst Cir.
2004) (dismissing Lanham Act claim for alleged false attribution in fourth edition of textbook);
Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (refusing to limit
Dastar to non-copyrighted works). See generally Ginsburg, supra note 95.
273. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b. Some commentators have argued that the United States
may no longer be in compliance with the Berne Convention. See Fries & Remington, supra note 97,
at 70; Ginsburg, supra note 95.
274. Lastowka, supra note 105, at 1211.
275. The Court noted that because VARA contained the only recognized right of attribution, no
right of attribution existed under other legal schemes. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 35 (2003) ("Recognizing in § 43(a) a cause of action for misrepresentation of
authorship of noncopyrighted works (visual or otherwise) would render these limitations superflu-
ous.").
276. See, e.g., Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353,
407 (2006) (Exclusion of other works of art from moral rights "invites the argument that since Con-
gress intended to limit moral rights protection to a small subset of authors and works, it must have
intended not to provide such protection to authors and works not covered by the statute."). See also
Ginsburg, supra note 95, at 268 (Court "may have disqualified authors from pleading the trademark
act's prohibition on false designation of origin to support a claim to attribution of authorship
status.").
277. Kimberly Y.W. Holst, Comment, A Case of Bad Credit?: The United States and the Pro-
tection of Moral Rights in Intellectual Property Law, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105, 114-15
(2006).
278. Nimmer, supra note 70, at 63.
279. Difficulties in resolving this question prevented Congress from providing moral rights
protection to creators who participated in collaborative works. See supra note 91.
Creator-Assignee Standing
regardless of whether a work-made-for-hire relationship was formed.28°
Additionally, such a law will lead to more litigation, and given the liti-
gious nature of the United States, may be "nothing less than a formula
for an explosion of dubious claims.",281 Given these concerns, it is doubt-
ful that Congress will expand copyright law to provide for a general right
of attribution. Therefore, another method is required to fulfill the
constitutional goal of protecting a creator's interests.
Because no right of attribution exists, nor is ever likely to, creators
must resort to other legal theories and maneuvers to protect their rights.
One such method is to allow a creator to bargain with the copyright
owner for an assignment of the infringement claim and granting the crea-
tor-assignee standing to pursue the claim. While courts have prohibited
assignments of causes of action, most courts have done so only in two
types of claims-personal injury and malpractice-because of concerns
regarding champerty 282 and the plaintiffs lack of a personal stake.283
Because the creator-assignee is directly tied to the work that is the
subject of the infringement action, these concerns are nonexistent.
VI. CONCLUSION
Copyright law has evolved tremendously from its colonial and
constitutional beginnings. A system that once included protection of
creators' interests now focuses on an owner's control. Somehow the con-
stitutional goal of protecting a creator's rights in her work has been lost.
The decision in Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. is just
another example of the law's flagrant disregard of a creator's interest in
her work, even a creator's financial interest.
When it became a signatory to the Berne Convention, the United
States agreed to protect creators' attribution and integrity interests. The
United States has yet to fulfill this obligation by enacting comprehensive
moral rights legislation. Current copyright law provides little protection
of these interests; rather, the law is designed to protect pecuniary inter-
ests. To what extent, then, should a creator's interests be protected?
Many times the creator may not be the owner of the copyright.
Absent a written agreement otherwise, authorship, and hence, ownership
280. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 491 (2000).
281. Nimmer, supra note 70, at 54.
282. Champerty is defined as "an agreement between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and
a litigant by which the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant's claim as consideration for receiving
part of any judgment proceeds." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (8th ed. 2004).
283. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't., Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 900-01 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bea, J.
dissenting).
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of copyright vests in an employer under the work-made-for-hire doctrine.
Even if the creator does not own the copyright, if the creator is injured
through another's infringement of her work, a creator should be able to
seek redress. To do this, the creator should be allowed to negotiate with
the copyright owner (usually her employer) to receive an assignment of
the cause of action. The copyright statute permits this through its divisi-
bility provisions. Nowhere in the statute are assignments of causes of
action prohibited. If the creator can satisfy the standing and real party in
interest requirements, then the creator should be allowed to bring the
infringement action.
Such a rule acknowledges a creator's moral right of attribution as
required under the Berne Convention and advances constitutional goals
as well. By denying standing to a creator who purchased an assignment
of an accrued cause of action for infringement of his creation, the Silvers
court forgot that the creator's work represents a "fragment of the world"
which "belongs to him alone."
